Managing growth within city-regions and reducing urban sprawl and its associated costs presents particular challenges to metropolitan areas encompassing numerous local governments. In the United States, two basic pathways to managing regional development have been followed in recent decades. Some state and local governments have adopted top-down, regulatory mandates that carry the ‘teeth’ to enforce growth controls – this approach has been characterised as ‘old regionalism’. Other metropolitan areas located in states lacking such regulations have relied on bottom-up, non-statutory, consensus-based initiatives referred to as ‘new regionalism’.

As demonstrated by the divergent experiences of metropolitan Portland, Oregon, and Denver, Colorado, explored in this article, each strategy has inherent strengths and vulnerabilities with their effectiveness ultimately dependent on partners sustaining their original collaboration, continually fostering public awareness and support and adapting their institutional mechanisms and processes to build effective collaborations. These U.S. cases point to the value of inter-jurisdictional planning initiatives thoroughly evaluating indigenous assets and leadership styles as a critical first step to developing multi-jurisdiction planning and management strategies.

The Costs of Sprawl
In the first quarter of the twenty-first century, the population of the United States is expected to grow by 75 million people. Under growth policies currently in place, 56 percent of that population will reside in sprawl development – characterised by low-density, automobile-dependent, low-income excluding, new development on the fringe of settled areas (Squires, 2002). The resulting loss of productive agricultural lands and the costs associated with providing infrastructure and services to low-density fringe developments will be significant and are coming at a time when state and local government are searching for ways to control expenditures.

According to the study The Cost of Sprawl – Revisited (Burchell et al., 2002), the application of growth control measures could help reduce sprawl in over half of those counties expected to otherwise experience such growth. The authors estimate that, overall, growth management policies could redirect 11 percent of new residential development and 6 percent of new jobs away from fringe areas and into already urbanised areas. While these estimates seem relatively modest, the impacts of growth policies would be greatest in the western United States where the most rapidly growing regions are located.

Pathways to Managing Growth
In the United States, managing growth and controlling sprawl have been central policy concerns for state and local governments since the 1960s. By 2010, there were between 12 and 20 states – depending on how growth management is defined – that had established growth management systems (Weitz, 1999). These systems are built on a combination of regulations and incentives. States generally endeavour to establish state-wide growth management goals, leaving it up to local governments to develop their own plans to meet those goals. In most cases, regional planning is identified as a mediating level between local and
state plans where areas of coordination can be identified without the state appearing to reach too far into local affairs (DeGrove, 1992). The growth plans of many states are intentionally designed to be a patchwork quilt stitched together from local and regional plans.

Simultaneous to the development of state-wide systems, growth management policies and practices were evolving at the local level. These had the benefit of addressing immediately evident problems and demonstrating to voters that their concerns over sprawl were being addressed. However, they also had the unintended consequence of promoting leapfrog development as builders sought land outside the sphere of heavy regulation. In order to address the inherent limitation of a purely local approach, local governments along with nonprofits and for-profit interests have come together to form regional strategies. These strategies typically rely on local governments employing their regulatory powers to implement elements of the regional plan within their own jurisdiction or having a regional delegation apply to the state for special legislation to empower an existing or newly formed regional authority to implement some aspect of their plan (c.f., Gainsborough et al., 2006; Porter and Wallis, 2000).

In short, two basic pathways toward growth management have been followed over the past four decades in the United States. One pathway flows from the state down to local jurisdictions. It employs a combination of regulatory controls and incentives, and typically includes mandatory along with voluntary elements. This pathway has also been described as ‘old regionalism’, which stresses coordination among local governments and regional agencies (Wallis, 1994). The other pathway flows from the local level to the region. It builds on a multi-sector coalition of interests voluntarily bound together to achieve a shared vision and goals. This bottom-up path has been described as ‘new regionalism’, which stresses collaboration (Wallis, 1994). Some regions have pursued both pathways, either sequentially or simultaneously.

Advocates of the first pathway see it alone as having sufficient ‘teeth’ to stay the course and achieve substantive objectives; but detractors see the top-down approach as antithetical to the idea that land use decisions should be made locally. Advocates for the second pathway believe that its voluntary approach gives it legitimacy and connects it with local values; but critics see it as lacking sufficient implementation capacity to stay the course when growth pressures and the desire to capture new tax bases challenge allegiance to the collaborative effort. Over time, both pathways have converged on the regional level. The top-down pathway sees the region as a logical scale at which to mediate local and state interests, as well as inter-local interests (e.g. Vermont’s requirement that large-scale developments with impacts that spill over the boundaries of the authorising local government engage in an analysis of developments of regional impacts (DRIs) with all affected jurisdictions). As mentioned previously, the bottom-up pathway sees the region as a logical scale at which to coordinate local initiatives so as to assure that they meet shared goals while avoiding unintended spillover effects.

The pathway taken by a state or local government depends on where it is trying to get to, as well as where it is coming from. A state with weak home rule and a strong tradition of centralised authority might follow a top-down approach, but not if it lacks a goal it is trying to achieve. Indiana, for example, has been losing valuable agricultural land to urban sprawl for decades. Although it has a tradition of exercising strong centralised authority over local governments, it has not been motivated to employ its authority for the protection of farm lands.

Contrasting Cases of Portland and Denver
To better understand these pathways and what their evolution toward managed growth looks like, it is useful to compare a region-scale case study from each. The Portland, Oregon, metro-area, at least on the surface, offers a strong example of top-down regionalism in a state that enacted growth management in 1973. The Mile High Compact and Vision 2020 developed in the Denver, Colorado,
region provide a strong example of the bottom-up pathway. Both regions employ an urban growth boundary as a principal implementation mechanism and rely on enhanced transit investments to help promote the revitalisation of existing communities.

The Denver and Portland metro areas are fairly comparable in size. As of 2009, the city of Denver had a population of a little over 600,000, while its metro area (MSA) contained 2.93 million people, equivalent to 58 percent of the state’s population. The city of Portland had a population of a little over 529,000 in a metro-area (not including Vancouver, Washington) of over 2.2 million, equivalent to almost 56 percent of the state’s population. The current densities of the two cities (but not their regions) are nearly equal, 3,870 persons per square mile in the city of Denver and 3,980 persons per square mile in the city of Portland.

The case studies that follow first describe the evolution of each region’s growth management system, then compare the factors leading up to their development and implementation. Each case ends with a brief discussion of its effectiveness in achieving growth management goals.

**Metro-Portland, Oregon**

In 1973, Oregon became the third state in the United States to pass state-wide growth management legislation, known as the Growth Act. Under the law, all local comprehensive plans must be compatible with state-wide goals, and all cities must establish an urban growth boundary (UGB). The growth boundary is a regulatory mechanism for controlling urban expansion into surrounding farmlands and open space. A requirement for setting the UGB in Oregon is inclusion of sufficient land to accommodate residential growth for the next 20 years.

Oregon provides incentives for carrying out its growth management requirements in the form of grants and technical assistance to local jurisdictions conducting planning activities. On the enforcement side, the state can suspend a local government’s ability to issue building permits and it can block the distribution of some state funds (Abbott, 2002; Ingram et al., 2009).

**Antecedent conditions:** The confluence of a number of conditions helped give rise to Portland’s UGB. Over the decade leading up to Oregon’s growth law, the Portland region was expanding into the Willamette Valley, which is the state’s most productive agricultural region. Governor Tom McCall, a moderate Republican, wanted to make Oregon an environmental model for the nation. Portland’s Mayor, Neil Goldschmidt, a progressive Democrat, was concerned about revitalising declining neighbourhoods and shoring up a local transportation system on the verge of bankruptcy. Limiting growth on the urban fringe could help make existing neighbourhoods more attractive while bolstering transit ridership.

The efforts of these very visible political champions of growth management rested on a foundation of collaborative interests in Salem (the state’s capital and second largest city) as well as Portland. On the one hand, agriculture interests championed the protection of the Willamette Valley. At the other hand, environmentalists and many urban business interests found common ground in promoting the idea of managing urban growth.

When Governor McCall left office in 1975, he helped to establish the non-profit 1,000 Friends of Oregon. That organisation has served as a watchdog over the implementation of the growth management legislation, helping to assure that its objectives were not compromised (www.friends.org).

**Process:** Because of its size, the Portland metro region was required to develop a single growth boundary encompassing three counties. The Columbia Region Association of Governments (CRAG), which was already serving as the region’s Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO), was charged with developing the UGB.

During the process of developing a growth boundary, CRAG was abolished by the state legislature and its
responsibilities were assigned to the Metropolitan Service District (MDS), which at the time was responsible for solid waste disposal, operating the zoo and some other regional services. In the same act, the legislature made MSD a directly elected government. To this day, it remains the only directly elected regional government in the United States.

The MSD established the region’s first UGB in 1979. Since then, it has been expanded about three dozen times, but typically with the addition of relatively small increments of land (Metro, n.d.). Participation was a key aspect of the process of establishing the UGB and began when voters were asked to approve by referendum the designation of CRAG as the authority to draw the UGB. It continued through the efforts of organised groups such as 1,000 Friends of Oregon. At a state-wide level, 19 specific goals were developed through a year-long public participation process (see Figure 1 showing the original UBG and expansion planned to 2040).

Paralleling the public participation process, CRAG and then the MSD (later renamed ‘Metro’) had a budget that allowed it to employ a large and sophisticated planning staff. Adequate and competent analytic capacity was essential for drawing up a UGB that would be technically rigorous and legally defensible in case its methods were challenged.

Figure 1: Map of Portland’s UGB with Proposed Additions to 2040

Source: Metro 2009
Implementation mechanisms: Today, Portland’s UGB is visible at many points along its boundary where urbanised development stops abruptly and agricultural uses begin. During its first 15 years in operation, the UGB increased density by about 8 percent (see Table 1). Portland’s established neighbourhoods have been clear beneficiaries. With the supply of land limited, older homes have seen a significant increase in value and ridership on the once failing transit lines is robust. An early and persistent downside of this revitalisation has been a significant decline in housing affordability (Knapp, 1985).

Table 1: Growth in the Portland-Vancouver Urbanised Area, 1950-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area (in square miles)</th>
<th>Population (per square mile)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>4,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>3,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>3,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>2,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>3,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>3,167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The evident success of the Growth Act has also made it a target for pro-growth interests. There have been several attempts to change the land use planning system. In its first decade, there were three unsuccessful initiatives to reverse the Growth Act (1976, 1978 and 1982). In 2004, a state-wide citizen initiative (Measure 37) passed, requiring that jurisdictions compensate owners when their regulations restricted the use of land by a private property owner, thereby reducing its fair market value. Over 7,000 claims were filed under Measure 37, threatening to undermine the growth management system. In 2007, the Legislature referred Measure 49 to the voters. It was designed to overturn or otherwise modify many of the provisions of Measure 37. As a result of its passage (62 percent voted in favour) only 117 compensation claims were actually paid through 2009.

Metro-Denver, Colorado

A year after Oregon passed its Growth Act, a Bill was introduced in the Colorado General Assembly that would have established comprehensive growth management in that state (DeGrove, 1984). Although the Bill failed by just a few votes, it was the closest Colorado has since come to adopting a managed growth system.

In the absence of a state-wide system, cities, counties and regions developed their own growth management plans. For example, in 1967, Boulder was one of the first cities in the nation to establish a UGB. Perhaps the most significant of these sub-state efforts, at least in terms of scale, was the development and adoption of the Mile High Compact in the metro-Denver region.

The Denver Regional Council of Governments (DRCOG) serves as the state designated MPO for metro-Denver, known as ‘the mile high city’. The Metro Mayors Caucus is a voluntary association of area mayors formed in 1993 to provide a nonpartisan vehicle for fostering cooperation on issues affecting the entire region. In August 2000, these two organisations jointly endorsed the Mile-High Compact. The compact is a voluntary agreement among Denver metro area cities and counties to manage growth throughout the region by adhering to principles outlined in the Metro Vision 2020 plan.

The Vision is a 20-year growth plan identifying where transportation investments will be made, where growth is expected to occur and how the region will attain federally mandated air and water quality standards (DRCOG, n.d.). To a large degree, the Vision is an elaboration of the long-range transportation plan that all MPOs are required to develop as a condition for receiving funds from the U.S. Department of Transportation. What is unusual here is the UGB element, which goes well beyond
typical metropolitan plans (see Figure 2 showing the original and revised 2035 UGB). As of December 2010, 46 communities representing about 90 percent of the region’s population had signed the agreement. Notably missing are two of the regions six urban counties (Adams to the east and Jefferson to the west).

Antecedents: During most of the 1980s, Colorado’s population growth was in the doldrums. Forty percent of downtown office space was vacant, reflecting the disappearance of 28,000 energy-related jobs due to the withdrawal of federal price supports for western oil shale development. Out of the depths of this recession, the Metro Denver Network was formed. The Network is the nation’s first and only truly regional economic development entity in which many area economic development groups have joined together to represent and further the interests of an entire region (Metro Denver Network, n.d.). The idea of the network is to allow all of the region’s economic development organisations to join together to market the region collaboratively. Once a prospect indicates interest in locating to the region, all members can compete to win the new business.

Another notable regional collaboration formed during the 1980s is the Scientific and Cultural Facilities District. During the recession, major cultural facilities found their revenues plummeting. Rather than engage in more aggressive individual fundraising to make up for the shortfall, the major institutions banded together to place an initiative on the ballot that would establish a special taxing district. The

Figure 2: Mile High Compact Participants

Source: DRCOG, 2009
largest organisation would share in a significant portion of the revenue stream, but the remainder would go to smaller organisations. Today, the Scientific and Cultural Facilities District is the first and one of only two such regional taxing districts in the United States.

In 1993, the Metro Mayor’s Caucus – another U.S. first – was established as a regional leadership forum. These developments and others provide evidence of a strong collaborative culture in the region. One factor helping to contribute to this culture was the mayorality of Federico Pena, whose tenure in office spanned much of this period. Pena staffed senior city positions with people who were highly skilled at negotiations and consensus building.

**Process**: When Colorado pulled out of its recession in the early 1990s, building construction took off. Newly urbanising areas were being developed at a third of the density of the regional average. During this time, DRCOG was developing its Vision 2020 plan. Initial public participation was low, and the process was largely staff driven. Two things occurred to change this. First, the Metro Mayor’s Caucus decided to make managing growth, and especially curbing sprawl, a priority issue. Since the same mayors are DRCOG members, their wishes energised staff efforts. A new, broadly representative 40-member task force was established and charged with examining alternative growth scenarios.

The second development was the re-election of Roy Romer as Governor of Colorado for a third term. During his campaign, Romer made smart growth an element of his platform, promising to convene a state-wide summit on growth if he was returned to office. Within two months of the election, Romer hosted a meeting with 1,000 attendees, half of them from the Denver metro area. Although Romer’s efforts ultimately yielded no specific legislative proposals, they had the effect of giving further visibility to DRCOG’s Vision 2020.

The 2020 Task Force developed four growth scenarios ranging in total estimated land area from 650 to 850 square miles, compared with the region’s existing urbanised area of 535 square miles. The Task Force decided to focus on an alternative that would limit growth to 700 square miles through the use of an urban growth boundary. This alternative would also focus future transportation investments along existing major transportation corridors, thereby reinforcing established business centres, a provision that older, inner ring suburbs strongly favoured. The Vision also called for maintaining the physical independence of free standing communities (such as Boulder to the north and Castle Rock to the south) so that their boundaries would not become blurred in a mass of outward moving sprawl.

In order to translate these general ideas into specific recommendations, particularly in terms of drawing the UGB, in 1996 DRCOG dissolved the task force and established a steering committee. Whereas the task force was comprised totally of elected officials, the steering committee also included for-profit and non-profit members.

The committee divided the region into four quadrants and began holding meetings with local governments in each quadrant to figure out how to achieve the targeted 700 square mile UGB goal. The greatest source of resistance came from a few municipalities that had not benefited from the robust growth of the 1970s. With the opening of a new airport in the northeast quadrant, they felt that it was now their turn to develop. As a result of their resistance, the proposed UGB was expanded to include 727 square miles.

In 1997, a new policy committee was established to take over from the steering committee. Its charge was to craft policies and procedures for implementing the Vision. Regarding the UGB, the committee recognised that the power to establish and enforce the boundary resided with each municipality and county containing a piece of the boundary. Consequently, those local governments would have to modify their comprehensive plans to be consistent with the UGB and other elements of Vision 2020. When a local government signed on to
the Mile High Compact, it was agreeing to adopt and maintain its portion of the UGB.

The next problem addressed by the committee was how to allow for the modification of the boundary. Three specific policies for adjusting the boundary were developed (DRCOG, 1998).

- **Self certification.** Local jurisdictions would be allowed to make modest modification to their portion of the UBG if they did not increase the total area permitted for future urbanisation.

- **Regional review and input.** If a proposed UGB change raised regional concerns, for example by affecting the interests of an adjacent community, a Metro Vision Policy Committee would evaluate the potential impacts of the change. If deemed necessary, mediation and negotiation services for affected communities would be provided to resolve conflicts.

- **Changes requiring DRCOG board action.** More substantial changes to the regional Vision, including the UGB, would be reviewed by DRCOG’s policy committee and a recommendation forwarded to the Board for a formal vote.

**Implementation and evaluation:** Metro Vision, along with the Mile High Compact, took close to a decade to develop. In order to identify progress, DRCOG initiated a series of periodic reports on achieving its 2020 goals. The second such report, issued in 2008, showed that the region was adding an average of 14 square miles a year to its urbanised area. According to the revised Compact and Vision (now going out to 2035), the region should have been growing by no more than seven square miles per year. At its then current rate, the urbanised region would contain 1,106 square miles rather than its revised targeted goal 921 square miles.

In order to achieve its revised land consumption goal, counties and their cities would have to increase their densities in the range of 13 to 69 percent, for an average of 24 percent (see Table 2). DRCOG believes that it is currently achieving a densification rate of 26 percent. However, that is occurring in a building market mired in deep recession that has significantly shut down new development at the urban fringe. Other elements of Vision 2020/2035, notably the idea of using multimodal transportation to revitalise existing urban centres, are proceeding with more visible impact. A significant factor accounting for this success was the passage of the so-called FasTracks initiative in 2004. FasTrack is in the process of building 122 miles of light rail transit at an estimated cost to build out by 2017 of $6.9 billion (RTD FasTracks, n.d.).

**Comparison of Pathways**
The two case study regions clearly share important antecedent conditions. In both, there was a strong environment of collaboration among key stakeholders cutting across public, private and non-profit sectors. In the Portland case, these interests were already working (in both the Portland and Salem regions) on developing voluntary growth controls before Governor McCall provided an opportunity to move the effort to the state-level. Consequently, rather than resisting the potential assertion of state authority in local growth discussions, these regions saw the state as providing a powerful mechanism for advancing their main objectives of preserving agricultural land while revitalising existing urban centres. In Denver, the collaborative, multi-sector coalition had a history of passing several innovative regional initiatives. These coalition efforts did not face any major organised opposition. Instead, the public participation processes that they employed allowed opposing views to be heard and incorporated where deemed appropriate by the majority of stakeholders.

In both cases, political leadership was essential to advancing the efforts. Portland had both an activist mayor in Neil Goldschmidt and an activist governor in Tom McCall. Denver had its counterparts in Federico Pena and Roy Romer. But whereas McCall was able to bridge partisan differences and win consensus in the legislature, Romer faced a body with key leadership that was blatantly antagonistic to growth.
### Table 2: Comparison of Metro Denver and Portland Metro

#### Metro Denver 2006-2035

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total 2006 Urban Area</th>
<th>HH in 2006 Urban Area</th>
<th>Density in Total 2006 Urban Area</th>
<th>2035 UGB</th>
<th>HH in 2035 UGB</th>
<th>Density in 2035 UGB</th>
<th>% Increase in Density from Total 2006 Urban Area Baseline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adams County</td>
<td>116.5</td>
<td>144,182</td>
<td>1,238</td>
<td>178.4</td>
<td>280,917</td>
<td>1,575</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arapahoe County</td>
<td>126.0</td>
<td>210,559</td>
<td>1,671</td>
<td>158.9</td>
<td>358,451</td>
<td>2,256</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boulder &amp; Broomfield Counties</td>
<td>107.3</td>
<td>129,486</td>
<td>1,207</td>
<td>134.6</td>
<td>202,657</td>
<td>1,506</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear Creek &amp; Gilpin Counties</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>1,953</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>3,675</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>37.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denver</td>
<td>102.6</td>
<td>255,897</td>
<td>2,494</td>
<td>112.8</td>
<td>358,005</td>
<td>3,174</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douglas County</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>81,942</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>121.0</td>
<td>184,728</td>
<td>1,527</td>
<td>69.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson County</td>
<td>158.6</td>
<td>200,452</td>
<td>1,264</td>
<td>179.6</td>
<td>278,749</td>
<td>1,552</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SW Weld County</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>11,853</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>56,211</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>732.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,036,325</strong></td>
<td><strong>1415</strong></td>
<td><strong>981.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,723,393</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,756</strong></td>
<td><strong>24.1%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Metro Portland 2010-2035

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total 2010 UGB Area</th>
<th>HH in 2010 UGB Area</th>
<th>Density in Total 2010 UGB Area</th>
<th>Total 2035 UGB Area</th>
<th>HH in 2035 UGB Area</th>
<th>Density in Total 2035 UGB Area</th>
<th>Percentage Increase in Density from 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clackamas County</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>101,236</td>
<td>1,052</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>163,959</td>
<td>1,652</td>
<td>57.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multnomah County</td>
<td>183.60</td>
<td>283,693</td>
<td>1,545</td>
<td>183.6</td>
<td>474,477</td>
<td>2,584</td>
<td>67.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington County</td>
<td>119.70</td>
<td>79,153</td>
<td>1,497</td>
<td>138.8</td>
<td>270,389</td>
<td>1,948</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metro UGB</td>
<td>399.60</td>
<td>564,082</td>
<td>1,412</td>
<td>421.6</td>
<td>908,825</td>
<td>2,155</td>
<td>52.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark County</td>
<td>116.34</td>
<td>134,205</td>
<td>1,154</td>
<td>126.6</td>
<td>191,644</td>
<td>1,514</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington (rough estimate of UGA)</td>
<td>116.34</td>
<td>134,205</td>
<td>1,154</td>
<td>126.6</td>
<td>191,644</td>
<td>1,514</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 4 County Urbanised Region</strong></td>
<td><strong>515.94</strong></td>
<td><strong>698,287</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,353</strong></td>
<td><strong>548.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,100,469</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,007</strong></td>
<td><strong>48.3%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on Metro polices in effect 10/2011
management legislation; a factor that may explain why Romer never proposed legislation following the conclusion of his Smart Growth Summit.

This last point goes to key differences between the regions. With the Colorado legislature as a non-viable option for implementing a region growth management system, Denver had little choice but to develop the most effective bottom-up, collaborative system possible. The political will to do this was significantly provided by the Metro Mayors Caucus, whose interest in establishing a regional growth management system provided the essential motivation for DRCOG to take a routine planning process and achieve an exceptional outcome.

In terms of performance goals, going out to 2035, Portland Metro hopes to achieve a density of 2,007 households or 4,838 people per square mile (see Table 2). By contrast, Metro Denver’s density goal is 1,756 households or 4,286 people per square mile. DRCOG hopes to increase its urban density 24 percent by 2035, while Portland Metro is aiming to increase its urban density by 48 percent. These numbers alone suggest that Portland has a more aggressive programme, which perhaps only a rigorously regulatory approach could hope to achieve. But Denver’s goals of densification are impressive given its far higher projected rate of population growth and lower agricultural land values at the urban fringe.

Matching a Region with a Pathway

There is a telling story of an Allied forces pilot shot down behind enemy lines in occupied France during the Second World War. After walking away from his wrecked plane, the pilot came across a sympathetic farmer. “Please monsieur” he asked, “what’s the best way to get back to Allied territory?” The farmer scratched his head and thought for a moment, then replied: “If I were you, I wouldn’t start from here”. The path you take depends on your starting point. In the top-down approach, the regulatory capacity of the state, among other factors (such as 1,000 Friends of Oregon and a regional planning agency with sophisticated planning capacity), seems to enable maintenance of the goals of the growth management system. In the bottom-up approach, self-regulation appears to make goals vulnerable to the politics of local growth pressures.

If the strength of the top-down approach comes from stronger regulatory capacity, the very use of that capacity makes it vulnerable to frontal attack. As Measure 37 in Oregon demonstrates, putting a successful measure on the ballot could jeopardise the entire system. By contrast, the political vulnerability of the bottom-up system consists of yielding to peer pressure. Protection against both sources of vulnerability is the same: keeping the original collaboration intact while maintaining strong public awareness of achievements and therefore public support.

Perhaps the clearest lesson for other regions from these two cases is that the path to growth management is an extension of the path that a region is already on. Its course must be set on the foundation of its own political culture, its history of collaboration (or lack thereof), and its institutional capacities at both the state as well as local levels. Neither path is inherently superior to the other. They simply represent different options and implementation challenges.

Nevertheless, once on a pathway, continued progress depends on understanding and cultivating the logic inherent to that course of action. In an analysis of the efforts of four different regions to build effective coalitions, Margaret Weir observes that some regions are able to develop a virtuous cycle. As she describes the development in Oregon, “authority [there] developed a virtuous cycle in which policy and politics reinforce one another: as regional decision-makers moved into new areas, the political coalition that supported it actually grew stronger” (Weir, 2000). In the case of Denver, there has been a virtuous cycle moving from one successful regional collaborative to another (e.g. from establishing the business network to the SCFD). It is less clear that the specific coalition that helped develop the Mile High Compact is sustaining itself, or if key parties,
such as the Metro Mayors Caucus have moved on to other agendas. Moreover, having started from the bottom-up, the Denver coalition has still not crafted an effective strategy to tie its efforts to legislation that could empower, sanction and support attainment of its long-term goals.

Other regions considering growth management alternatives would do well to examine the path they are already on. What capacity and political will exist to exert centralised regulatory control? How strong is the environment of collaboration? What initiatives have already been taken by local jurisdictions? Are there strong advocates within the private and non-profit (NGO) sectors in support of growth management? Whatever conclusions such an examination draws, the general principle is to start from where you’re at, perhaps understanding it for the first time.

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Endnotes

1 The idea of pathways as employed here is based on concepts of the new institutionalism, especially in the work of such economists as Nobel Prize laureates Oliver Williamson and Douglass North. The application of that perspective to issues of growth management has been most clearly developed by Margaret Weir at the University of California Berkeley.

2 Metropolitan Planning Organisations are designated by their states to be the regional transportation planning agencies for the purpose of conducting the kinds of long-range planning required by the federal government for the purpose of receiving feral transportation grants.

3 For a brief history of the Metro Mayors Caucus, see http://www.metromayors.org/History.html.

4 One of Mayor Pena’s major collaborative achievements was to win approval of the annexation of 53 square miles of Adams County to Denver County for construction of the new Denver International Airport.


References


